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INTRODUCTION 
South African local government has been transformed fundamentally in 
the last 10 years from structures catering for the needs of a small segment 
of the population to a more democratic system. (Cameron, 2001). The 
policy of ‘developmental local government’ has been introduced in order 
to deal with the huge service backlog in primarily Black areas that the 
new government inherited from the apartheid regime (Parnell et al, 2002).  
Constitutional decentralisation of functions and powers to local 
government is a fundamental feature of this new system. 
 
A two-tier system of local government consisting of district and local 
municipalities was introduced in non-metropolitan areas to promote 
service-delivery. This paper is an analysis of how this new system of 
local government has been functioning since it was implemented after the 
December 2000 elections.  
 
This paper focuses on two specific themes. Firstly, it examines the 
relationship between district and local municipalities. While the state is 
committed to decentralising powers to local government it is not clear 
whether the district or the local should be the primary beneficiary of this 
policy. Secondly, it looks at the contested decision to include both 
secondary towns and rural areas in local municipalities. 
 
A two-part decentralisation framework was developed to guide this 
analysis. Firstly, there is an examination of the theoretical material on 
decentralisation. The paper argues that this literature does not deal 
adequately with situations where there are two-tiers of local government 
sharing functions and powers, When there is expectation amongst both 
tiers of local government that they would be the primary beneficiaries of 
a decentralisation policy, this often leads to conflict. Secondly, it also 
looks at the socio-geographic or settlements pattern approach to 
demarcation which attempts to correlate local government boundaries 
with their respective interdependent socio-economic areas.  This 
approach influenced the Municipal Demarcation Board in South Africa 
into including urban and rural areas in the same jurisdiction.  
 
After the theoretical discussion the paper traces the macro-analysis of the 
state’s evolving policy towards non-metropolitan local government. This 
is followed by an examination of the perceptions of key local government 
stakeholders on the impact of this new local government policy, namely 
their ‘experience of transformation/consolidation from below’. A number 
of qualitative interviews (around 50) were conducted primarily with 
senior officials and politicians in district and local municipalities as part 
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of a number of concurrent research projects between April and December 
2002. In addition interviews were also conducted with private sector 
consultants, academics and programme experts. The information used in 
this paper is derived from some of these interviews. 
 
FRAMEWORK FOR DECENTRALISATION 
 
Political decentralisation to local government is favoured for a number of 
reasons. Some of the more important arguments are that it enables 
minorities to avail themselves of government power, it can keep power 
close to citizens, it can prevent arbitrary central government rule, it can 
promote political participation and it ensures more efficient service 
delivery of local government services (Maass, 1959; Sharpe, 1970; 
Grindle, 2000; Wunch and Olowu, 1990). 
 
There is little conformity amongst various authors on the meaning of the 
term decentralisation.  One of the most commonly accepted distinctions is 
to regard decentralisation as a blanket term encompassing a number of 
sub-categories:  devolution (or democratic decentralisation), 
decentralisation and delegation (Rondinelli, 1981, also see Widmalm, 
2003). 
 
Devolution (democratic decentralisation) is the most extensive form of 
decentralisation.  According to Manor (1999: 6) it is the transfer of 
resources and power to lower level authorities which are largely or 
wholly independent of higher levels of government and which are 
democratic in some way and to some degree.  
 
Devolution/democratic decentralisation generally has the following 
characteristics: 
 Local government should be separate constitutionally from central 
government. It should be responsible for a significant range of 
services. 
 They should have their own treasury, separate budget and accounts 
and their own taxes to produce a significant part of their revenue. 
 Local authorities should have the right to allocate substantial resources 
including the power to decide over expenditure, vary revenue and the 
appointment and promotion of staff. 
 Policy should be decided by local councils, consisting predominantly 
of elected representatives. 
 Central government administrators should play an indirect, advisory 
and inspectorate role only  
(Mawhood, 1993:9-10, as adapted) 
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Deconcentration is normally the least extensive form of decentralisation.  
It often involves the transfer of workload from the central government 
head offices to regional branches located out of the executive capital.  It 
may involve limited discretion for field staff to perform factors within the 
constraints of central government policy.  Effective control over major 
policy decisions resides at central level (Rondinelli, 1981:137). 
 
Delegation entails the transfer of broad authority to plan and implement 
decisions concerning specific activities to organisations outside the 
national public service such as local government that are technically and 
administratively capable of exercising them (Rondinelli, 1981:138).  
Although delegated power is normally controlled by the attachment of 
conditions by the delegating body, this form of delegation can lead to the 
exercise of a certain amount of judgement and discretion on the part of 
the local authorities. 
 
It is worth briefly mentioned a couple of other definitions to illustrate the 
divergent views about decentralisation. In terms of Mawhood’s (1993) 
definition, decentralisation would be equivalent to the foregoing 
definition of devolution while deconcentration would seem to cover the 
foregoing definition of both deconcentration and delegation. 
 
Manor (1999) has yet another definition. He suggests that there are three 
different definitions of decentralisation. Firstly, there is deconcentration 
or administrative decentralisation  which refers to the dispersal of agents 
of higher levels of administration into lower level arenas. Secondly, it is 
refers to downward fiscal transfers by which higher levels of government 
cedes influence over budgets and financial decisions to lower levels. This 
may be to deconcentrated bureaucrats who are accountable to higher 
levels of government only.   Thirdly, there is devolution which as already 
mentioned is described as the transfer of resources, powers and functions 
to lower level authorities which are largely or wholly independent of 
higher levels of government and which are democratic in some way, and 
which are democratic to some degree. In terms of this definition there 
would be general consensus with Rondinelli’s definition of 
decentralisation but there is a slightly different conceptualisation of 
deconcentration and delegation. 
 
The definition of devolution/democratic decentralisation is a useful 
starting point.  It is however a necessary but not a sufficient condition.  
An over-reliance on legal intergovernmental relations sometimes 
obscures the real nature of power at local government.  Constitutional 
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lawyers are often guilty of an overemphasis of legal intergovernmental 
provisions at the expense of political relationship (1). For example, 
Migdal (1988) argues that although many Third World states ascribe huge 
powers to themselves, they are often extremely weak and unable to 
implement their own legislation. This means that a nominally centralised 
country could in practice, at least outside the national capital, be rather 
decentralised by default in that the state apparatus lacks capacity in rural 
areas.  
 
The role of party politics in gauging the extent of political 
decentralisation is also very important.  Elazar’s 1968 argument that the 
existence of the non-centralised party system is perhaps the most 
important element in a decentralised system is perhaps still valid today 
(1968:37). Studies have shown that the effects of political 
decentralisation are negated by party centralisation. (Cameron, 2003) If 
important local government decisions are made by party bosses of 
centrally or regionally based political parties it will undermine the 
principle of local democracy, namely that local decisions should be made 
by elected local representatives.  
 
Another point is that decentralisation per se does not empower local 
government. Manor (1999:10) makes the important point that there is a 
difference between decentralisation policies at intermediate as opposed to 
local levels. Federal states in particular tend to empower the second tier 
of government whether it is the state or the province often at the expense 
of local government. In fact, in the Third World there has often been 
conflict between federal authorities and local governments. In countries 
such as Nigeria and Brazil, second tier authorities have in the past been 
particularly centralist towards local authorities, often denying them 
financial resources. This is because they regard third tier structures as a 
threat to their power (Mawhood, 1989:5-6).  
 
What the decentralisation literature is largely silent on is the implications 
of when there is more than one local government operating in the same 
jurisdiction and sharing functions and powers. There is some literature on 
how two-tier metropolitan authorities relate to each other. For example, 
Barlow (1991:26 as adapted) suggests that are three possible models of 
two-tier relationships in metropolitan areas: 
 
 The lower-tier units are subordinate to the metropolitan authority, 
 i. e. the upper tier dominant model; 
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 The lower-tier units are superior in that they are considered the 
primary agents of local government, i.e. the lower tier dominant 
model; 
 The lower-tier and metropolitan authorities are considered 
complementary, having equal status and rank in the governmental 
system, i.e. the complementary model. 
 
There is little literature dealing with similar two-tier problems in rural 
local government which because of the sparseness of the population often 
have larger jurisdictions than more densely inhabited metropolitan areas. 
Arguably, Barlow’s model would also be generally applicable to rural 
local government. Unless the complementary model applied, there would 
be winners and losers. If the upper tier dominant model applied, the 
lower-tier would be largely disempowered and conversely if the lower-
tier dominant model applied, the upper-tier would be largely 
disempowered.   
 
What this means is that while there may be consensus amongst 
government planners that decentralisation to local government should be 
promoted it does not necessarily mean that all structures of local 
government will be empowered. Sometimes this is not contentious; for 
example an upper-tier authority may be set up a service coordinating 
body rather than a fully-fledged level of local government. However, 
when there is expectation amongst both tiers of local government that 
they would be the primary beneficiaries of a decentralisation policy, this 
would often lead to conflict between the two tiers. This is the problem 
area in South Africa which will be addressed in this paper. 
 
FRAMEWORK FOR DEMARCATION 
One of the most important approaches used when demarcating local 
government boundaries is the socio-geographic or settlement patterns 
approach which attempts to correlate local government boundaries with 
their respective interdependent socio-economic areas.  (see Cameron, 
1999).  This approach influenced the demarcation of local government 
boundaries in South Africa in 1999/2000 (Cameron, 2000). Human 
settlement patterns refer primarily to the geographical or spatial patterns 
of settlement (Mabin, 1997).  A belief that government areas no longer 
correspond to settlement patterns and the spatial behaviour of 
communities has often led to the reform of local government systems 
(Smith, 1985:64).   
 
Sharpe (1988:103-104) describes the socio-geographic approach 
objective as an  
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‘attempt to bring the boundaries of local authorities more into line 
with present-day settlement patterns by joining up the continuously 
built-up areas of cities with their burgeoning suburbs and beyond’. 
 
These spatial behaviour studies attempt to map the areas of influence of 
urban areas by analysing economic and social activity, showing the socio-
economic interdependent area for which cities provide marketing and 
financial facilities.  This requires a great deal of knowledge, not only 
about the spatial distribution of settlements, but also the spatial patterns 
of socio-economic activity.  This requires systematic research into 
behavioural relationships between spatially defined groups, economic 
transactions, employment catchment areas most notably commuter 
patterns, spending patterns, cultural linkages and recreational habits. 
(Smith, 1985:64-66 and 1993:18-19). 
 
Bennett (1989:34-35) introduces the notion of ‘truly-bounded’.  Here, 
there is direct correlation between activity spaces and administrative 
structures.  More commonly, administrative structures are ‘under-
bounded’:  the activity space crosses over many local government 
boundaries with resultant ‘spillover’ problems.  ‘Over-bounding’ occurs 
where the activity space is only a small part of an administrative division.  
Local government reforms in countries such as Britain, Sweden and 
Eastern Europe have been influenced by the ‘truly-bounded’ concept.  
The less developed the social and economic life of the community is, the 
easier it is to identify the ‘natural’ boundaries of communities (Smith, 
1993:18-19). 
 
There are problems in achieving ‘truly bounded’ administrative spaces. 
For example, there is no consensus about the level of aggregation of 
preferences and activity spaces that is required. Another problem is the 
frequency of journeys and activities – some are frequent, while others are 
infrequent. There are also different types of activities, such as 
commuting, recreation and shopping. The functional concept therefore 
tends to increase administrative size beyond the range of normal activities 
of the majority of people. As a result, ‘over bounding’ is a frequent 
outcome of reforms based on activity spaces (Cameron, 1999:44–45, 
Bennett, 1989, Sharpe, 1995:22-23). Nevertheless, it is still a useful 
demarcation approach to apply. 
 
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT TRANSFORMATION: STRUCTURAL 
REFORM 
The Interim Constitution (1993A) and the Local Government Transition 
Act (LGTA) (1993B) provided the framework for local government 
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transformation in South Africa. Three phases were provided for 
transformation, namely, the pre-interim, interim and final phases. The 
pre-interim phase was the period after the first national elections in 1994, 
but before the first local government elections, which were held in 
1995/6. The interim phase was the period after the first local government 
elections until the implementation of the final constitution model and was 
characterised by power-sharing mechanisms. The final phase commenced 
with the implementation of the final constitutional model at local level. 
 
In the pre-interim phase, local negotiating forums were established. 
Transitional local councils (TLCs) were created in non-metropolitan 
areas and transitional metropolitan councils (TMCs) with substructures 
for metropolitan areas. These forums were supposed to represent 
‘economically and historically bound’ areas, which included criteria such 
as commercial and industrial linkages, daily commuting patterns and the 
area of jurisdictions of government bodies that existed before 1971 (the 
year black townships were excised from their ‘mother’ white local 
governments). 
 
The Interim Constitution had made provision for three different 
categories of local government, namely, metropolitan, rural and urban. 
The LGTA was initially silent on the issue of rural local government and 
was clearly designed for negotiations in metropolitan and urban areas. It 
needs to be pointed out that there was no tradition of democratic rural 
local government amongst whites in South Africa. It was only in the 
former Cape Province that there were democratically elected rural local 
government structures (Cameron, 1999:94–97). 
 
The central government decided that the pre-interim phase should not be 
applied strictly in rural areas. Some TLCs did include rural areas within 
their boundaries, but this was the exception rather than the norm. 
 
To give effect to the provisions of the Interim Constitution, a belated 
1995 amendment to the LGTA (about six months before the local 
government elections) made provision for rural local government 
structures. Provision was made for a two-tier structure. The upper tier 
was the district council (regional council in KwaZulu-Natal province). At 
the lower-tier level, provision was made for a menu of options. A 
transitional rural council was a fully-fledged local government structure 
elected on the 60% ward and 40% proportional representation formula. A 
transitional representative council (TRC) was elected on a proportional 
representation system only and had no executive powers, its functions 
being performed by district councils. ‘Remaining areas’ were areas not 
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covered by any primary local government. They were elected on a 
proportional formula at district council level only. Provinces had the 
discretion to decide which of the local government models they wished to 
adopt. 
 
For the TRC and ‘remaining areas’ options, provision was made for 
nominated interest group representation at district council level, with the 
proviso that there would be a maximum of 10% seats per group and on 
condition that interest groups did not exceed 20% of the total number. 
The four interest groups were farmers, landowners or levy payers; farm 
labourers; women; and traditional leaders. 
 
Although TLCs had representation on district councils, the upper-tier 
councils did not have any authority over the functioning of these urban 
municipalities (Cameron, 1999:98–99, Pycroft, 1996). 
 
 
THE FINAL SYSTEM OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
 
RSA CONSTITUTION OF 1996 
Section 155(1) of the final Constitution makes provision for category A, 
B and C municipalities.  The definitions are: 
 
(a) Category A:  A municipality that has exclusive municipal 
executive and legislative authority in its area 
 
(b) Category B:  A municipality that shares municipal executive and 
legislative authority in its area with a Category C municipality 
within whose area it falls. 
 
(c) Category C:  A municipality that has municipal executive and 
legislative   authority in an area that includes more than one 
municipality. 
 
The Interim Constitution had made provision for three different 
categories of local government, namely, metropolitan, rural and urban. 
However these rather rigid definitions had led to numerous 
demarcation disputes that had delayed the local government elections 
in the KwaZulu and Western Cape provinces. The intention of the 
more vague Category A, B and C categories were to provide sufficient 
flexibility to policy-makers when it came to the establishment of local 
structures (Cameron, 1999:231). 
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The next important policy initiative was the White Paper on Local 
Government which was released in March 1998. The White Paper 
made provision for a more powerful and strategic role for districts. 
Strong district municipalities were seen as necessary to, inter alia, 
promote district-wide integrated development planning, provide bulk 
services and build capacity in local areas. 
 
The White Paper argued that many boundaries had divided settlements 
irrationally, and that there was a need to create municipal institutions 
that recognised the linkages between urban and rural settlements. It 
suggested that almost all towns are linked functionally to rural areas, 
relying on their hinterlands for productive economic activity and 
providing critical centres for the delivery of social services (Provincial 
Affairs and Constitutional Development, 1998:14–15, 96–98). In 
particular, concern was raised that the service needs of farm workers 
and those forcibly removed to Bantustans (homelands) during 
apartheid were not catered for under the existing system of rural local 
government. Rural local government structures that were set up in the 
interim phase were largely political shells without any formal 
administration, with district councils providing most of the functions 
on an agency basis. The Local Government Municipal Structures Act 
(RSA, 1998A) embodied the spirit of the White Paper 
recommendations and made provision for more hierarchical two-tier 
local government systems in non-metropolitan areas. District councils 
became district municipalities and became the upper-tier (category C) 
authority. One fundamental change has been in functions, with district 
municipalities now assuming many responsibilities. In the past, 
districts had no jurisdiction in large urban towns. Now, district 
municipalities have assumed upper-tier responsibilities for some local 
government functions. 
 
The major responsibilities of districts were given as: 
 
 integrated development planning for the district as a whole; 
 promoting bulk infrastructure development and services for the district 
as a whole; 
 building the capacity of local municipalities where such capacity is 
lacking; and 
 promoting the equitable distribution of sources between the local 
municipalities in the district to ensure appropriate levels of services. 
 
At the lower-tier level, there were category B structures. Provision was 
made for only one form of B local government structure, namely local 
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municipalities. The Structures Act did not distinguish between urban and 
rural local government. This legislation both strengthened the role of 
districts and proposed one integrated form of non-metropolitan local 
government (Cameron, 2001). 
 
5. THE MUNICIPAL DEMARCATION BOARD 
It was within this policy framework that the newly established Municipal 
Demarcation Board stepped. One national board had replaced nine 
provincial boards. The major reasons for this were the need to have 
uniform national policy around local government policy and the tendency 
of provincial ministers for local government to demarcate boundaries 
they could win in the 1995/6 elections rather than supporting proposals 
that would facilitate service delivery and promote development 
(Cameron, 1999). 
 
Unlike the provincial boards, the national Municipal Demarcation Board 
was the final decision-making body when it came to the demarcation of 
boundaries. 
 
A major aim of the demarcation exercise was to rationalise the number of 
municipalities. The number of municipalities was reduced from 843 to 
284. Sections 24 and 25 of the Demarcation Act (RSA, 1998B) laid down 
the objectives and criteria that the Board had to take into account. There 
was no weighting of the criteria and the Board had discretion on how to 
interpret them. When it came to the rationalisation of B municipalities, 
the Board decided on the following principles, based on Sections 24 and 
25 of the Demarcation Act. 
 Geographical Continuity and Coherence: Because municipal 
government is so closely tied to local identity and accessibility to 
local representatives, rationalisation should generally follow ‘nearest 
neighbour’ principles – that is, there should be geographically 
coherent, consolidated category B municipalities. 
 Capacity Development: There should be a critical mass of municipal 
capacity (staff, assets, finances) especially where there were under-
resourced municipalities. 
 Resource Sharing: Wherever possible, existing municipalities should 
be combined with the view to realising fiscally sustainable units 
with weaker areas being paired with stronger areas to achieve a 
sharing of existing or potential sources. 
 Manageable Size: A statistical derived indicator of 3 500 km2 and 80 
000 persons was suggested as the possible norm for category B 
municipalities. However, deviations from the norm were inevitable 
given the uneven geographical distribution of population and 
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economic activity throughout the country. The Board’s empirical 
research suggested that populations of less than 20 000 are generally 
undesirable for category B municipalities given the objectives of 
realising economies of scale in municipalities. 
 Functionality: Amalgamation of places with commuting, shopping and 
social links was another important consideration. This linked rural 
areas and ex-homeland (the nominally independent states created for 
Blacks during the apartheid era) areas with urban towns. 
 
These principles attempted to redress the effects of apartheid-era 
displacement and made provision for future growth. 
 
The Board felt that the best means of determining the interdependence of 
people, communities and economies was through commuting patterns. 
This was because commuting is probably the best single measure of the 
relationship between human settlements on the one hand, and 
employment spending and amenity usage patterns on the other. The 
Board was of the view that a metropolitan or local council should 
encompass at least 50% of all people who live, work and shop within that 
area (Municipal Demarcation Board, 1999). 
 
Due to time constraints (which were extremely tight given the electoral 
timetable), the Board did not debate appropriate theoretical models of 
demarcation that could guide the process. Nevertheless, the Board was 
influenced implicitly by some of these models, most notably the socio-
geographic or settlement pattern approach. 
 
As pointed out, the socio-geographic approach attempts to look at the 
socio-economic interdependent areas for cities and towns. It looks at 
commuting and spending patterns, cultural linkages and recreational 
habits (see Cameron, 1999:41–45). The socio-geographical approach was 
seen as a way of redressing apartheid social patterns by including poor 
blacks from rural areas and ex-bantustans in towns and in so doing 
implementing a key goal of the White Paper. 
 
Bennett’s bounded concepts were described in the first part of the paper 
but for the purposes of this section will be briefly repeated. (1989:34–35). 
‘Truly bounded’ is when there is direct correlation between activity 
spaces and administrative structures. ‘Under bounded’ is when the 
activity space crosses over many local government boundaries. ‘Over 
bounding’ occurs where the activity space is only a small part of an 
administrative division (Bennett, 1989:34-35). 
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Historically, South Africa’s local government boundaries were ‘under 
bounded’ because of apartheid fragmentation. The results of provincial 
demarcation in 1994/5 were quite uneven. Some boundaries were ‘truly 
bounded’, others became less ‘under bounded’, and some were as 
fragmented as they were under apartheid. 
 
The Board primarily used commuting as a means of dealing with the 
illogical spatial apartheid distortions in attempt to create)‘truly bounded’ 
boundaries.  However, this approach was hotly contested and this 
urban/rural debate has turned out to be one of the central issues in post-
2000 non-metropolitan local government.  
 
FINANCE 
 
 
The Final Constitution gives local government the right to impose taxes 
on property and surcharges on fees for services provided.  Municipal own 
revenue is obtained through property taxes, regional council levies and 
service charges and fees. Many municipalities make profits from the 
reticulation of water and electricity. Own revenue covers more than 90% 
of the operating income of local government as a whole.  Local 
government is entitled to an ‘equitable share’ of revenue raised 
nationally. However grants from national government comprise only 
about 7% of total local government budgets. 
 
In practice different types of local government have different 
responsibilities.  In larger urban areas, municipalities are often 
responsible for a range of functions and services, while rural local 
governments generally provide fewer services.  Prior to the 2000 
amalgamations, rural councils had little or no fiscal capacity and a limited 
economic and tax base.  The district council usually performed all the 
fiscal functions assigned to its rural municipalities (National Treasury, 
2000A:  100). 
 
The Department of Finance is of the view that local government should 
be primarily self-financing.  The view of the department is that the major 
financial problem of many local authorities is not the lack of income per 
se, but rather poor financial management.  Problems include poor 
budgeting systems, inadequate revenue collection systems and lack of 
basic treasury functions (National Treasury, 2000B: 103). 
 
The department’s focus is aimed at improving local government financial 
management.  The Local Government: Municipal Finance Management 
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Bill, 2003, is aimed at making local government more efficient and 
effective.  It is intended to modernise the budgeting, financial reporting 
and financial management systems of local government (RSA, 2003). 
 
The alternative view, held by the South African Local Government 
Association (SALGA), the Municipal Demarcation Board and many non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), is that central government is not 
providing local government, faced with apartheid backlogs, with 
sufficient revenue sources to execute its constitutional responsibilities.  
There are many municipalities, particularly local governments which are 
largely rural based, which have no tax base at all.  While financial 
management could be improved, it is not the major financial problem 
facing municipalities.  Those who hold this view would argue that the 
equitable share has to be increased significantly so local government can 
deal with the development burden (Cameron, 2002). 
 
THE DEMARCATION DISPUTE: 1999–2000 
 
This tension around local government finance manifested itself in a major 
conflict around the demarcation of local government boundaries in 
1999/2000. As pointed out, the Demarcation Board, with its final 
decision-making powers, rationalised municipalities from 843 to 284. The 
Board primarily used functional interdependence of communities and 
minimum sizes to achieve economies of scale as the basis of its 
demarcation. The aim was to create bigger municipalities with larger tax 
bases that would be able to promote services and development in a 
sustainable manner. In order to achieve this, urban and rural local 
authorities were combined into single municipalities (Cameron, 2000). 
 
The Department of Finance (informally supported by a number of B 
municipalities) virulently opposed the Board’s preliminary proposals. A 
memorandum by the Director-General of Finance to the Board argued 
that the Board’s proposed boundaries would weaken the fiscal position of 
non-metropolitan cities and towns structurally and as a consequence 
constrain rather than enhance their ability to raise capital and develop 
infrastructure (water, power, etc.), which is their key responsibility. 
Already before demarcation, the long-term debt market had largely dried 
up (Department of Finance, 2000:106). The concern was that the resultant 
diminished creditworthiness would mean that the only source of capital 
available in some municipalities would be government transfers. 
 
The department made an analysis of three existing towns in which it was 
shown that non-metropolitan towns (B municipalities) generally would 
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face a marked structural decline in their fiscal position as a result of the 
inclusion of considerably more disadvantaged black areas into their 
jurisdictions. It found that in the case of Welkom, the inclusion of 
additional territory with large amounts of poor rural households would 
lead to a 25% decline in total income per capita, a 23% decline in rates 
and general income per capita, a 34% decline in trading service income 
per capita and, as a corollary, a 29% rise in dependence on equitable 
share grant allocations. A similar scenario in East London would lead to a 
36% decline in total income per capita, a 35% decline in rates and general 
income per capita, a 37% decline in trading service income per capita, 
and a consequential rise in dependence on equitable share allocations. 
The Board was asked to revisit its demarcation of non-metropolitan towns 
and cities (Department of Finance, 2000). 
 
The Board responded by disputing the methodology used by the 
department. It argued that the Department of Finance’s report gave no 
indication of what power and functions were being analysed against 
available income; ignored the fact that the smaller the boundaries the 
greater would be the spatial inequalities and the greater the correlation to 
the old apartheid order; and incorrectly presumed that boundary 
demarcation of financial viability and creditworthiness. The Board 
accused the department of boundary determinism because of the latter’s 
inference that boundaries are the prime determinant of creditworthiness 
and financial viability. The Board did not change its boundary proposals, 
which were used for the December 2000 local government elections. 
(Municipal Demarcation Board, 2000). 
 
The Board also responded to the department by emphasising that it had 
never stated that all its municipalities would be financially viable. Its own 
research showed that 102 new municipalities – mostly B categories in the 
former independent and self-governing territories – are weak and have 
limited financial resources. Given spatial inequalities arising from 
apartheid underdevelopment, the task of making all municipalities viable 
was always going to nearly impossible. This was exacerbated by lack of 
finality on national financial policy for local government. The Board 
made a number of recommendations for extra sources of revenue, 
including a surcharge on personal income tax and a substantial increase in 
the equitable share (Municipal Demarcation Board, 2000). This was not 
accepted by national government. 
 
What this meant is that many local governments were established without 
the extra sources of revenue recommended by the Board. What is also 
important for the understanding of this paper is that this integrated urban 
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and rural local government models were contested even before the new 
system was introduced. It was perhaps then not surprising that this issue 
flared up soon after the new system was introduced, an issue that will be 
looked at later in the paper. 
 
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS 
 
The Constitution  (RSA, 1996) states in section 156(1) that a municipality 
has executive authority in respect of, and has the right to administer the 
local government matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of 
Schedule 5.  These functions are contained in the table below. 
 
Schedule 4 Part B Schedule 5 Part B 
 Air pollution 
 Building regulations 
 Child care facilities 
 Electricity and gas reticulation 
 Firefighting services 
 Local tourism 
 Municipal airports 
 Municipal planning 
 Municipal health services 
 Municipal public transport 
 Municipal public works 
 Pontoons, ferries, jetties, piers 
and harbours, 
 Stormwater management 
systems in built-up areas 
 Trading regulations 
 Water and sanitation services  
 
 Beaches and amusement 
facilities 
 Billboards and the display of 
advertisements in public places 
 Cemeteries, funeral parlours and 
crematoria 
 Cleansing 
 Control of public nuisances 
 Control of undertakings that sell 
liquor to the public 
 Facilities for the 
accommodation, care and burial 
of animals 
 Fencing and fences 
 Licensing of dogs 
 Licensing and control of 
undertakings that sell food to the 
public 
 Local amenities 
 Local sport facilities 
 Markets 
 Municipal abattoirs 
 Municipal parks and recreation 
 Municipal roads 
 Noise pollution 
 Pounds 
 Public places 
 Refuse removal, refuse dumps 
and solid waste disposal 
 Street trading 
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 Street lighting 
 Traffic and parking 
 
 
 
Category A municipalities (metropolitan areas) have all the above listed 
functions.  However, Section 154(3)(c) then states that subject to section 
229, national legislation must make provision for an appropriate division 
of powers and functions between municipalities when an area has 
municipalities of both category B and category C. In addition, a division 
of powers and functions between a category B municipality and a 
category C municipality may differ from the division of powers and 
functions between another category B municipality and that category C 
municipality. (Section 155(3)(C)). 
 
The Constitution introduces the principle of ‘shared authority’ in a district 
area.  The division of powers and functions between Category B and C 
municipalities must be done in a way that promotes municipal services in 
an equitable and sustainable manner. (Section 155(4)). 
 
Section 84 of the Municipal Structures Act (RSA, 1998A) as amended 
(RSA, 2000) divides the powers and functions between these two 
categories of municipalities.  Section 84(1) states that a district 
municipality has the following functions and powers: 
 
(a) Integrated development planning for the district 
municipality as a whole, including a framework for 
integrated development plans of all municipalities in 
the area of the district municipality. 
(b) Potable water supply systems. 
(c) Bulk supply of electricity, which includes for the 
purposes of such supply, the transmission, distribution 
and, where applicable, the generation of electricity. 
(d) Domestic waste-water and sewage disposal systems. 
(e) Solid waste disposal sites, in so far as it relates to- 
(i) the determination of a waste disposal strategy; 
(ii) the regulation of waste disposal; 
(iii) the establishment, operation and control of 
waste disposal sites, bulk waste transfer 
facilities and waste disposal facilities for more 
than one local municipality in the district. 
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(f) Municipal roads which form an integral part of a road 
transport system for the area of the district 
municipality as a whole. 
(g) Regulation of passenger transport services. 
(h) Municipal airports serving the area of the district 
municipality as a whole. 
(i) Municipal health services. 
(j) Fire fighting services serving the area of the district 
municipality as a whole, which includes- 
(i) planning, co-ordination and regulation of fire 
services; 
(ii) specialised fire fighting services such as 
mountain, veld and chemical fire services; 
(iii) co-ordination of the standardisation of 
infrastructure, vehicles, equipment and 
procedures; 
 (iv) training of fire officers. 
(k) The establishment, conduct and control of fresh 
produce markets and abattoirs serving the area of a 
major proportion of the municipalities in the district. 
(l) The establishment, conduct and control of cemeteries 
and crematoria serving the area of a major proportion 
of municipalities in the district. 
(m) Promotion of local tourism for the area of the district 
municipality. 
(n) Municipal public works relating to any of the above 
functions or any other functions assigned to the 
district municipality. 
(o) The receipt, allocation and, if applicable, the 
distribution of grants made to the district municipality. 
(p)      The imposition and collection of taxes, levies and    
duties as related to the above functions or as may be 
assigned to the district municipality in terms of national 
legislation. 
 
Section 84(2) then states that a local municipality has the functions and 
powers in Schedule 4 Part B and Schedule 5 Part B as listed in the 
Constitution, excluding those functions and powers vested in terms of 
section 84(1) in the district municipality in whose area it falls.  
 
A legal opinion (Kennedy, 2003) suggests that a district municipality has 
only such functions and powers as set out in Section 84(1) and that a local 
municipality has all other functions and powers in terms of the 
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Constitution and legislation. Kennedy states that it is accordingly 
apparent that the legislature intends that ordinarily the functions and 
powers of a district municipality and those of the local municipalities in 
its area will be mutually exclusive (unless otherwise qualified in sec 84 by 
words such as “for the area of the district municipality”) 
 
The implementation of this Act would have necessitated a fundamental 
reallocation of functions and powers between the district and the local 
municipalities after the December 2000 elections. However it became 
apparent that it would not be logistically possible to transfer all these 
functions and powers and the Municipal Structures Act was amended 
making provision for temporary authorisations (RSA, 2000). This 
amendment also appeared to have vested large operational responsibility 
for large-scale service provision at district level. This includes significant 
services such as water, electricity, waste and health services.  This 
indicates a shift away from the strategic oversight rule and bulk provision 
role initially envisaged for districts.  This amendment appears to have 
reduced the functions and powers of local municipalities.  This caused a 
storm of protest from B municipalities who argued that the amendment 
would disempower local municipalities. It was argued that this victory for 
the pro-redistribution lobby within the state who saw a strong district as a 
means of redistributing resources from urban towns through to rural areas 
which included ex-homelands areas and contained some of the poorest 
parts of South Africa. 
  
However the effects of this amendment was mitigated by the blanket 
authorisations of the Minister enabling local municipalities to continue 
performing these functions on a temporary basis.  In terms of Section 
84(3) of the amended Act, the National Minister of Provincial and Local 
Government could authorise a local municipality to perform a function or 
exercise a power mentioned in Section 84(1)(b) (potable water supply 
systems); (c) bulk supply of electricity, which includes for the purpose of 
such supply, the transmission, distribution and, where applicable, the 
generation of electricity; (all domestic waste water and sewerage disposal 
systems); and (i) (municipal health services). The minister must do this 
after consultation with the cabinet member responsible for the functional 
area in question and the MEC (Member of Executive Committee) for 
local government in the province concerned. 
 
On 28 November 2000, the minister authorised local municipalities to 
perform the functions and assume the powers mentioned above, all of 
which before the election date were performed by the disestablished 
TLCs or transitional rural councils (but not TRCs), but only within the 
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areas of such disestablished councils. However, this authorisation was not 
a blanket exemption. The new local councils could only provide services 
to the portion of TLCs and rural councils they were servicing before the 
election. For example, in some cases, TLCs did not provide the services 
to ex-BLA areas included in their jurisdiction after the 1995/6 municipal 
elections) (RSA, 2000A). These temporary authorisations were for many, 
an attempt to freeze the status quo given the poverty that existed in many 
rural areas.  An analysis by the Demarcation Board showed that the 
greatest backlog for major services lay outside the ex-TLC areas 
authorised by the Minister to provide health, electricity, water and 
sanitation (Municipal Demarcation Board, 2001). 
 
Unlike the powers that the Provincial Member of Executive Committee 
(MEC) has, the minister is not subject to a recommendation from the 
Demarcation Board in exercising ministerial power. The minister has 
ongoing discretion in the authorisation of municipalities for these factors. 
 
 With regard to the other municipal functions, the Provincial Minister for 
Local Government (the MEC) in a province may in terms of Section 18 
of the Municipal Structures Amendment Act (subject to the 
recommendations of the Demarcation Board) authorise a local 
municipality to perform and exercise in its area the other functions 
provided for in Section 84. This includes integrated development 
planning, solid waste disposal, municipal roads, municipal airports, 
municipal health services, fire-fighting services, fresh-produce markets, 
cemeteries and crematoria, promotion of local tourism and municipal 
public works. A district municipality may also be authorised to perform 
the functions of a local municipality. Basically, these temporary 
authorisations were designed to ensure service continuity during the 
transition to the reallocation of functions and powers between the local 
and district. 
 
The Demarcation Board submitted recommendations in this regard to 
MECs for local government on 18 April 2001, and most MECs gazetted 
authorisations to give effect to the recommendations of the Board. All 
authorisations by MECs should have lapsed by 5 December 2002 but an 
extension was granted to 1 July 2003 so that the transfer of functions and 
powers could conform to the beginning of the financial year for 
municipalities. 
 
In some municipalities there has been intensive conflict between 
functions and powers. This has been reflected in the debate around the 
Minister’s four functions. 
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WATER AND SANITATION 
 
Big cities and urban towns had historically made surpluses on the sale of 
water which had been used to cross-subsidise the general operating 
budget. In November 2001, the position of the Department of Water 
Affairs (DWAF) was that no long-term authorisations for the water and 
sanitation service function should be given to local municipalities and this 
function should remain with district municipalities in terms of the 
provisions of the Municipal Structures Amendment Act. 
 
The DWAF’s position was that there should be one water service 
authority (governance) for the area that may enter into contracts with 
separate providers to do bulk and retail water supply. 
 
However, in its policy paper on 31 January 2002, the Department of 
Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) recommended that 62% of 
category B municipalities should be authorised to perform the water and 
sanitation functions. This was largely a U-turn of the DWAF position. 
There was heavyweight support from treasury and senior elements of the 
DPLG to keep water and sanitation at B level because of concerns about 
the financial implications of secondary cities losing this source of 
revenue. In terms of departmental influence, the DWAF is rather 
lightweight and in effect, it lost this battle. 
 
Subsequently, the DPLG and DWAF had consultation meetings that 
resulted in a modification of the DPLG position with B municipalities 
now being authorised to perform 54% of the water functions. It needs to 
be noted that this authorisation is for the entire function. B municipalities 
can still contract bodies such as water boards to provide the function. In 
some provinces (the Free State, Gauteng, the Northern Cape, the Western 
Cape and Mpumalanga), all municipalities are authorised; some 
provinces have mixed authorisation (North-West and Limpopo); while 
other provinces have limited authorisation (the Eastern Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal). What this means is that the system will not be uniform 
between and within provinces. Given the income-generating nature of 
water and the need to consider adjusting a number of related functions to 
the level of local government level that provides this function, it can be 
argued that there are going to be some municipalities that have a weak 
district–strong local relationship and others where there is strong district–
weak local relationship (Municipal Demarcation Board, 2002A).  
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Electricity 
The Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs has overall responsibility 
for the electricity function in South Africa. Its policy position is that it 
needs to restructure the electrification industry due to the national 
electrification needs, price inequalities, service and skill disparities, 
fragmentation resulting in wide disparities in tariff structures, and 
economies of scale. 
 
Six economic centres and models around the six metros have been 
identified. They will form the basis of regional electricity distributors 
(REDs) that are going to be established in the country and that will take 
responsibility for the electricity distribution.  
 
Currently, Eskom provides the bulk supply of electricity. About 130 B 
municipalities provide electricity reticulation, while Eskom provides 
electricity directly to consumers in most of the other municipalities. 
 
As with water, the ‘status quo’ authorisation of the national minister in 
November 2000 authorised the B municipalities to perform the electricity 
function only in the TLC areas, and category C municipalities were 
authorised to perform the functions in the remaining areas. 
 
Most municipalities use the surpluses of trading services to cross-
subsidise rates accounts. There is serious concern about the impacts of 
REDs on the financial viability of municipalities. SALGA and the 
treasury have commissioned a study into the impact of electricity 
restructuring on local government finance. It has been estimated that the 
costs of restructuring the electricity are R512 million (Municipal 
Demarcation Board, 2002B). 
 
 Health 
Municipal health is a local government constitutional function and a 
district function in terms of the Municipal Structures Amendment Act. 
Along with electricity, potable water, and domestic water and sewerage 
systems, health is one of the four national functions the authorisation of 
which is the responsibility of the Minister of Provincial and Local 
Government. 
 
B municipalities were authorised to continue performing this function in 
terms of the temporary authorisations of November 2000.  64 category B 
municipalities were authorised to render the district municipal function of 
municipal health services. This means that B municipalities provide a 
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range of health services within the service area of the former TLCs, while 
district municipalities perform these functions in all other areas within the 
newly demarcated local municipality. The effect of this is a duplication of 
structures with a consequent waste of scarce resources. 
 
Local governments currently provide primary health services, which 
refers to the operation of clinics and environmental health services. In 
reality, there is a great deal of variation in the range and level of services 
provided by municipalities. A Task Team on the Division of Powers and 
Functions between category B and category C municipalities for health 
services was put together in early 2002. It consisted of officials of both 
the Department of Health and the DPLG. This task team put together a 
consensus report recommending that the definition of municipal health 
services be linked to environmental health services (for example, the 
control of air pollution, the care and burial of animals, markets, municipal 
abattoirs). The balance of primary health care packages would become 
the responsibility of the provincial health authorities. The Department of 
Health believed that in all cases the district should be the service 
authority in that it would set policy and tariffs. It was hoped that many B 
municipalities currently providing the service would be contracted to be 
the service provider for health (Municipal Demarcation Board, 2002C). 
 
However the provisions of the National Health Bill, 2003 did not reflect 
this understanding and may lead to considerable confusion at local level. 
‘Municipal health services’ is a district function in terms of the Municipal 
Structures Act, but ‘municipal health services’ as defined in the National 
Health Bill, also includes functions vested in local municipalities. In 
terms of the Municipal Structures Act these local functions cannot be 
allocated to district municipalities if capacity exists at local level to 
perform them (Municipal Demarcation Board, 2003). 
 
There is also a disjunction between the water and health functional 
allocations. The water service authority for about 54% of all B 
municipalities will be the B authority, while the service authority for 
health, at least in terms of the Municipal Structure Act, is going to be the 
C authority. Given the obvious linkages between health and water 
functions, this is problematic. 
 
 
THE INTERVIEWS 
 
In this part of the paper the perceptions of key local government 
stakeholders on the impact of this new local government policy, namely 
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their ‘experience of transformation/consolidation from below’ was 
examined. The following information was obtained in the interviews 
mainly with senior managers and councillors but to a lesser extent with 
private sector consultants, academics and programme experts. 
 
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS 
 
Probably the biggest problem facing municipal managers was the lack of 
clarity about powers and functions.  These temporary authorisations 
meant that there was great uncertainty about whether key functions would 
remain local functions or be transferred to be the districts. This 
manifested itself in uncertainty about future functions and powers and a 
complex set of transitional service arrangements [Respective ministerial 
authorisation for Bs and Cs were re-issued only in January 2003 and took 
effect from 1 July 2003, two years since the status quo ante was put in 
place in December 2000). 
 
There were severe criticisms from some of the interviewees about this 
division of functions and powers, most notably from senior officials from 
B municipalities.  The most problematic function was that of water.  
Many B municipalities have big water engineering departments.  B 
municipalities make surpluses from the reticulation of water to cross-
subsidise other activities.  There was concern that the loss of this function 
to the district would lead to the loss of a major source of revenue.  It 
would, for example, prevent B municipalities from offering cheaper 
tariffs as part of a water intensive industry programme.  There were also 
concerns raised about accountability.  If water were transferred to the C 
municipality, it would blur accountability.  People would still complain to 
the B municipality about non service-delivery but the C municipality 
would control the infrastructure and the tariff policy. 
 
The current system of temporary authorisations of both the National 
Minister and respective MECs was described by interviewees as 
‘complex’, ‘a nightmare’ and leading to ‘a lack of clarity’.  For example, 
in George, to supply water to rural areas in the old TRC areas formerly 
residing under the district council and now part of George meant getting 
permission from the new district to supply George’s own water to its own 
community. (This was because in terms of the current authorisations the 
Minister of Provincial and Local Government only authorised B 
municipalities to provide water in the ex-TLC areas. The district 
municipality is still the service delivery agent for the rural areas and 
George has to get permission to deliver its water to such areas.) 
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The implications of electricity restructuring have alarmed officials and 
councillors of many municipalities. Some treasurers said that there would 
be massive increase in rates and services if electricity revenue is taken 
away and given to the proposed REDS. Councils’ credit rating could be 
affected. Payment for electricity is also an important element of the cash 
flow. In some municipalities as much as 87% of its 29 000 consumers are 
using prepaid meters. One treasurer said that ‘if electricity goes to REDS, 
the municipality might as well just close up shop’. 
 
Although councils are guaranteed a share of the profit of REDS, there is 
no clarity about when it is going to be paid these profits or what the 
profits would be. Most councils would need this money upfront rather 
than at the end of the financial year. Theoretically, there could be savings 
from the fact that billing and collections would no longer be a B 
municipality function, but no municipality interviewed has quantified this 
amount. 
 
The health function was also problematic. As pointed out in terms of 
proposed national health legislation, the service authority for primary 
health will be the district. The view of one B manager is that primary 
health is a function they would do well to get rid of. While this 
municipality has not quite adopted a scorched earth policy toward this 
function, there is clearly no incentive to invest in infrastructure for this 
function. This is generally true for most of the local municipalities where 
interviews were conducted. 
 
There were also criticisms of the MECs of local government who delayed 
the allocation of functions and powers through temporary authorisations.  
This has frozen the status quo and makes forward planning difficult. 
 
Another problem that was raised is that financial institutions are reluctant 
to rate local authorities until there is clarity about powers and functions.  
This affects their ability to borrow money on capital market. 
 
A number of interviewees argued that it is difficult to promote 
development under such circumstances.  It is difficult to plan service-
delivery under such complex service-agreement arrangements.  One 
interviewee complained that B municipality officials are not interested in 
promoting development outside their core urban areas.  This is not 
surprising when they do not provide most services to newly incorporated 
rural territory and have little knowledge of such areas. 
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There are also problems around accountability.  In some B municipalities, 
the mayor of the new town stays in rural areas that were incorporated into 
the town in 2000.  This portion of the new municipality is still serviced 
by the district municipality.  Democratic theory suggests that local voters 
should hold local politicians accountable for local services that they 
provide.  If municipalities are unable even to determine services in their 
own areas, this creates accountability difficulties.  What exacerbates 
matters is that local politicians and consultants (who have been heavily 
involved in the drafting of Integrated Development Plans- IDPs) 
sometimes do not understand these complexities of service-delivery. 
 
There was an alternative viewpoint which suggested that the lack of 
clarity around powers and functions was used as an excuse by some 
managers for their own inaction. 
 
INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PLANS 
 
IDPs are the flagship development tools of municipalities.  An IDP must 
reflect a council’s vision for the long-term development of the 
municipality with special emphasis on the municipality’s most critical 
development and internal transformation needs.  Strategy should in turn 
structure and the Municipal Systems Act correctly says that budget 
should reflect IDP priorities.  Performance indicators also need to be used 
to measure IDP processes. 
 
District municipalities after consultation with local municipalities must 
adopt a framework for integrated development planning in its area as a 
whole.  This framework binds both the district municipality and local 
municipalities in the area of the district municipality.  A local 
municipality must in turn align its integrated development plan taking 
into account the integrated development processes of, and proposals 
submitted to it by the district municipality. 
 
Interim IDPs were put in place for 2001 which were basically a 
combination of the IDPs of previously incorporated municipalities.  The 
intention was that final IDPs should reflect the development needs of the 
new municipality as a whole.  At least in terms of the information given 
by interviewees, IDPs are progressing better than expected.  Many reflect 
strategic priorities and while the level of public participation is uneven, 
all IDPs reflect some level of public participation in this process. Many 
district municipalities have aided under capacitated B municipalities in 
putting their IDPs together. 
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This is not to say there are not problems with IDPs.  Some of the 
consultants interviewed said that some IDPs were merely wishlists 
reflecting community wishes and there was no strategic prioritisation of 
such wishes.  There was no sense of a development vision amongst many 
of the municipalities.  Other interviewees suggested that IDPs created 
unrealistic expectations about services, particularly amongst rural citizens 
about the extent of services that could be delivered to them.   Some 
interviewees felt that the public participation exercise had been somewhat 
rushed, but many expressed the view that next year there would be more 
time to consult the public.  In some cases ward committees1 had just been 
set up or were about to be set up.  It was felt that this should promote 
better public participation in future. 
 
From the IDP point of view the current allocation of powers and 
functions was highly problematic.  They created a huge amount of 
uncertainty.  As one manager said ‘I do not care whether a function 
should be performed by B or C municipalities, but please allocate it 
finally to one of them.  If you do so, I am confident of making the system 
work'. 
 
This lack of certainty reflected itself in the drafting of IDPs.  Some C 
municipalities used the letter of the Municipal Structures Act to plan for 
functions; i.e. what was the original intention of the policy-makers before 
all these temporary authorisations were enacted.  However, some B 
municipalities (such as George and Umlathuze Richards Bay)) planned 
for current functions, most notably, the National minister’s four 
functions, i.e. water, electricity, sewerage disposal and health.  The result 
is that in some cases, particularly around water and sanitation, the B and 
C municipalities, IDPs do not dovetail with each other. 
 
At least one district municipalityies had not linked the IDP with strategic 
priorities because of the problem of clarifying functions and powers.  A 
couple of interviewees said that B municipalities were not aware that 
items on the IDP and budgets were responsibilities of the district 
municipalities.  There were also items appearing on IDPs which were not 
local government functions such as agriculture. 
 
One senior manager conceded that the philosophy of the Demarcation 
Board in combining urban and rural areas into single municipalities was 
sound. Although no substantial service delivery improvement has taken 
                                                 
1 Ward committees consist of the councillor of the ward, along with up to 10 members of the local 
community.  They took effect after the 2000 elections and are intended to be instruments of 
participatory democracy.   
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place in the former homeland part of his municipality, plans have been 
conceptualised on what needs to be done and there is now a qualified 
town planner working in the area. This view is not shared by all. One of 
the functions of the IDP process was to begin to address the 
amalgamation of rural and urban areas. Some interviewees argued that 
there has been no real thinking in some areas about how to address this 
rule of local municipalities of an entirely new type. 
 
Many municipalities had linked their budget to the IDP but some had not.  
The reasons given were that this was the first year of the final IDP – there 
was no time to link it to budget.  It would however be done next year.  
Other municipalities, particularly C municipalities said there was not 
sufficient revenue to link budgets to the IDP.  Finally, some 
municipalities were not linking IDPs to budgets until there was clarity 
about functions and powers. 
 
FINANCE 
Many respondents from both B and C municipalities complained about 
lack of finance.  Many C municipalities struggling to define a role for 
themselves felt that the equitable share should be increased (bearing in 
mind that they initially did not get any equitable share in the 2001 
allocation). Some interviewees argued that capacity-building support 
programmes to underdeveloped B municipalities would be cut if there 
were no proper equitable share allocation.  
 
Some B municipalities however feel that they can ‘more or less’ get by 
with the income they have.  Others said they would survive, but had to be 
frugal with expenditure.  Other B managers felt that municipalities did 
not have the capacity to extend services into rural areas. The complaint 
was that the resources of the town were being spread too thin. The crucial 
question for some B managers was how to extend services into rural areas 
with existing sources of revenue. Some interviewees were of the view 
that the two-tier model of non-metropolitan government was not 
sustainable in many parts of the country.  Other interviewees however 
thought the system could work financially, providing that the district 
focussed its attention on developing B municipalities without capacity 
and did not take over B functions from capacitated local municipalities. 
 
One B manager said that the government was planning to download 
costly functions such as health on B municipalities while giving revenue-
raising functions such as water to C municipalities. 
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Another major concern cited was the splitting of resources between the 
district and local municipalities. There are two executive mayors, two 
speakers, two sets of councillors and administrations and a complete 
duplication of resources, particularly within the context of scarcity. This 
duplication was also causing confusion amongst the public. 
 
There was also conflict between the district and local when it comes to 
the allocation of resources. For example, Mbombela’s capital expenditure 
is done in terms of its IDP, based on the Development Bank of South 
Africa’s prioritisation model. There are examples of the district allocating 
resources to Mbombela with no consultation (e.g. the building of 
floodlights). This is distorting the priority list. Another problem that was 
cited was lack of co-ordination between B and C municipalities. For 
example, in one district the B municipality built 2 km of paved road in an 
area, while the C municipality built a community hall in the same area. 
However, due to a lack of co-ordination, the paved road did not extend to 
the community hall. 
 
A related problem is that district municipalities promise constituents 
certain items. If the district does not deliver, the B municipality gets the 
blame. This is compounded by the fact that districts do not have ward 
councillors. 
 
Some interviewees felt that the problem of local government in non-
metropolitan areas was not necessarily splitting of resources between two 
tiers, but rather the more general shortage of local government revenue in 
the country as a whole.  The lack of local government finance was a 
general problem of developing countries and even in some developed 
cities.  Given the large-scale poverty in South Africa, it would have made 
little difference financially if there had been different boundaries or 
different structures put in place. 
 
However, virtually all interviewees thought the equitable share should be 
increased so that local government could deal with the development 
burden more effectively.  One manager made the interesting suggestion 
that he was quite prepared for extra funds to his local government to 
come in the form of conditional grants, whether it be for national or 
provincial mandates or even locally formulated projects.  His council is 
quite prepared to put business plans and feasibility studies together as a 
basis for applying for conditional grants. 
 
There was the concern that from B interviewees that if revenue-
generating functions such as water and electricity were taken over by 
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districts and REDs respectively, this would lead to a massive increase in 
local rates.  Other B municipalities felt that the REDs were not such a 
major problem because the municipality would still be a dominant actor 
in the RED.  
 
There was also debate as to whether local government (whether B or C 
municipalities) should be the primary tier of government responsible for 
the upliftment of poorer areas (as envisaged in the two-tier non-
metropolitan system).  Some were of the view that this should be the 
prime responsibility of the national fiscus.  
 
Underfunded or unfunded mandates were a common refrain of almost all 
interviewees from both B and C municipalities.  There were a number of 
functions where provinces were accused of trying to devolve 
responsibilities to municipalities without the commensurate resources. 
Provincial health, libraries, museums, provincial traffic, transport plans 
and roads were the cited examples of underfunded or unfunded provincial 
mandates 
 
Others argued that expecting free water and electricity to come out of 
local governments budget was a form of an unfunded mandate.2 Even 
although there has been an increase in the equitable share, it does not 
cover the extra costs of providing free services. 
 
One municipality even argued that the inclusion of rural areas into urban 
towns after the 2000 elections was a form of an unfunded mandate. 
However they were not successful in persuading Treasury about the 
merits of their case.  
 
LOCAL - DISTRICT RELATIONSHIPS 
 
The interviews revealed there were different types of district-local 
relationships. The view of some C officials was that of a rather limited 
role for the district. They seemed to prefer a Regional Services Council 
(RSC)3 role for the district, namely the funding and development of 
infrastructure in areas of need. This view posits that the district is there to 
                                                 
2 It has been national policy since the December 2000 elections that 6 kilolitres of water and 20 
kilowatts of electricity be provided free by municipalities). 
3 Regional Services Councils were a coordinating upper tier local government structures created in the 
1980s primarily to develop infrastructure in poorer areas. In practice they had extremely limited 
jurisdiction over the functioning of primary local government. They were replaced by district 
councils/regional councils after the 1995/1996 local government elections (Humphries, 1991, Cameron, 
1993). 
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support and guide municipalities and they do not see themselves as 
usurping the traditional functions and powers of B municipalities.  
 
 
Some B managers felt that the two-tier system is a waste of resources in 
non-metropolitan areas when there is in any event limited revenue. 
 
The two-tier system also led to slow decision-making.  It was difficult to 
co-ordinate decisions across B and C municipalities when different 
aspects of the same function are split between these authorities.  For 
example, when it comes to a particular project sidewalks and planning 
could be provided by the one municipality and water performed by the 
other. 
 
Despite this, many B and C municipalities have common fora where they 
meet to discuss issues.  There are often good relationships between many 
B and C municipalities despite differences around Section 84 functions.  
Only in a few cases was there limited or poor co-ordination between B 
and C municipalities. 
 
If the B and C municipality are controlled by different political parties (as 
was the case in some municipalities in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-
Natal provinces), co-operation is difficult.  According to interviewees in 
George the relationship between the B and C municipalities has improved 
since the same political party (the Democratic Alliance) controlled the 
district municipality and George. Before the 2000 local government 
elections, the African National Congress (ANC) and the New National 
Party controlled the town and district respectively. This led to the 
politicisation of many technical matters. 
 
However, political control of both the B and C municipality by a political 
party does not guarantee effective co-operation.  It often depends on good 
personal relationships between the respective mayors and manager. A 
more profound reason was this conflict around functions and powers 
which has led to tension between B and C municipalities controlled by 
the same political party such as ANC-controlled Ehlanzeni and 
Mbombela and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)-controlled Uthungulu and 
Umlathuze. 
 
Some C managers. They felt that the core B municipality was promoting 
local economic development in a competitive way that was at the expense 
of the rest of the district. One positive sign is in Pietermaritzburg where 
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they planned to hold  a summit where a co-operative framework could 
hopefully be thrashed out by all the municipalities in the district. 
 
 FUTURE CATEGORISATION OF MUNICIPALITES  
 
As discussed some interviewees were of the view that the two-tier system 
of non-metropolitan local government was neither financially sustainable 
nor conducive to optimum decision-making.   
 
Some interviewees said that B municipalities should become metropolitan 
authorities or at least single-tier authorities.  Some officials from B 
municipalities, particular the bigger secondary cities said there was no 
need for a district and that they could do all the required local 
government functions.  However, one B manager who expressed this 
view also said his municipalities did not have capacity to extend services 
into rural areas.   A number of these officials complained about the fact 
that the district services areas outside these core towns yet it derives most 
of its income from RSC levies generated in core urban areas. 
 
It became apparent during the interviews that many of the B 
municipalities’ arguments in favour of an A structure was simply about 
retaining RSC levies4 (2 taxes on businesses) within the core town and 
not about spreading them to needier poorer areas in other rural parts of 
the district municipalities (in many districts most of the RSCs levies are 
generated in the core town’s commercial and industrial areas). RSC levies 
are the lifeblood of district municipalities and if secondary cities with 
narrowly drawn boundaries become A municipalities, district 
municipalities, the traditional service providers in rural areas, would lose 
a substantial portion of its income.  This could severely affect rural 
development (as what happened in the Western Services District Council 
when the Nelson Mandela metropolitan government was created in the 
Eastern Cape).  Some argued that this question of RSC levies had to be 
sorted out in a way that would not jeopardise rural development before 
there was any change in structure.  
 
Other interviewees argued that the creation of new metros would, 
irrespective of whether there were new revenue sources, lead to the 
neglect of rural areas on the periphery. They argued that these new 
metros would attract investment at the expense of peripheral areas. 
  
                                                 
4  RSCs levies consisted of two taxes on businesses. They were a service levy on wages and salaries of 
all employers and an establishment levy calculated on total sales recorded by businesses. 
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One C municipality treasurer however argued that management 
reorganisation should be divorced from the question of levies. He 
suggested that other ways of funding district municipalities needed to be 
explored. He argued that if there is a good argument in favour of A 
municipalities based on sound economies of scale reasons, then it should 
be supported. However, the structural debate needs to be divorced from 
the question of RSC levies. It was suggested that RSC levies should be 
collected nationally by the South African Revenue Service (SARS) and 
distributed back on the basis of need. If RSC levies were not part of the 
metropolitan debate, the metro lobby may have a different view of things. 
In any event, the SARS is more efficient in collecting taxes. 
 
There was a counter-argument from an interviewee which disputes the 
view that the rural dispossessed poor needs to be developed at the 
expense of urban areas.  The one interviewee quoted international 
literature that suggests the stronger the cities, the more likely rural 
development will occur. Emphasis should be put on rural education, but 
the infrastructure should go primarily to urban areas. 
 
It was suggested by one interviewee that the view expressed by the ANC 
a few years ago that provinces should be phased out was no longer valid.  
Provinces are important in that they give power bases to regional 
politicians.  The intention that districts would take over provincial 
functions is therefore no longer valid.  Some B municipalities such as 
Mangaung consist of urban and rural areas and undertake many district-
wide functions such as planning anyway.  
 
Another view was that there should be a mix and match system.  Where 
district municipalities were not much bigger than existing B 
municipalities with large-scale capacity they should be phased out.  
However, in any areas which were geographically dispersed and/or had B 
municipalities that lacked capacity, districts should exist and play a 
strong development role. 
 
Others interviewees were moreless circumspect arguing that a new 
system had just been in place and it should be given time to develop.  
This was the second reorganisation in five years.  Local government is 
going through a major reorganisation and it would be catastrophic to 
change things again. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has traced the evolving state policy towards non-metropolitan 
local government. There has been a move away from a fragmented 
system of secondary towns and rural areas towards an integrated 
approach of non-metropolitan government as a whole. The intention was 
that there should be a co-ordinated two-tier system of district and local 
municipalities. 
 
South African non-metropolitan local government is a classical case of a 
policy of decentralisation gone awry. There is still strong commitment to 
decentralisation by the state but different central government actors have 
different on whether the district or local municipalities should be 
strengthened. This in turn has led to a confusing set of powers and 
functions arrangements between districts and locals. 
 
The temporary authorisations have led to a hodgepodge set of 
arrangements. In some areas most notably in secondary cities, there are 
strong locals and weak districts, in some mainly rural areas there are 
strong districts and weak locals, in some areas (eg in Limpopo) where 
there are newly created districts there are both weak districts and weak 
locals while in the Western Cape (which is the only province with a 
strong tradition of rural local government in the apartheid era) there are 
strong districts and strong locals. 
 
In terms of Barlow’s model (1991) there are some districts where the 
upper tier dominant model is evident and in other cases the lower tier 
dominant model exists. There are some case where the district and local 
are considered complementary having equal status and rank in the 
governmental system, i.e. the complementary model. Two variants of the 
complementary system are evident, namely the weak complementary 
model where the district and local are equally disempowered and the 
strong complementary model where both the district and local have 
sufficient functions and powers. 
 
The lack of clarity about powers and functions is a major impediment to 
the smooth running of many B and C municipalities. The financial 
implications of the REDs policy on the viability of municipalities have 
been poorly thought out. Similarly, the lack of clarity about functions 
such as water and sanitation and health has led to uncertainty about what 
municipalities’ functions are and has affected future planning of such 
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services. This lack of clarity has led to delays in completing 
organograms. This has contributed to lack of staff morale. These 
temporary authorisations have led to a more fragmented form of service 
delivery than existed in the past, akin in some ways to United States of 
America cities. Ironically, this has, at least in the short term, negated the 
rationalisation intentions of demarcation. 
 
The 1 July deadline has expired but in terms of section 85 of the 
Structures Act the MEC for local government in a province may adjust 
the division of functions and powers (MECs functions only) between a 
district and a local municipality by allocating functions or powers from 
the local to the district or from the district to local. This may only been 
done if the municipality in which the function or power is vested lacks 
the capacity to perform that function or exercise that power; and the MEC 
has consulted the Demarcation Board and considered its assessment of 
the capacity of the municipality concerned. These are the long-term 
adjustments for MECs functions only as opposed to the short-term 
authorisations. 
  
 It is not clear how many municipalities are now using the Section 85 
provisions post-1 July but the early indications are that the functional 
fragmentation persists, with many districts performing local functions and 
many locals still performing district functions.   
 
The second major issue that the paper addressed was the controversial 
decision to include both secondary towns and rural areas in local 
municipalities. Given the symbiotic relationship between urban and rural 
areas exacerbated by apartheid settlement patterns, there were good 
reasons for the Municipal Demarcation Board to go for this particular 
policy option.  One must also remember that the adoption of the socio-
geographic approach was an attempt to embody a goal of the White 
Paper. At one level, many of these boundaries appear to conform to the 
socio-economic interdependent areas. The problem, in terms of service 
delivery, is that the greater the degree of interdependence, the larger a 
municipality will become. Many B managers said that their municipalities 
were stretched financially and administratively in delivering services to 
the vast rural areas that were now part of urban municipalities. It was 
pointed out that this socio-geographic approach to demarcation approach 
tends to increase administrative size beyond the range of normal activities 
of the majority of people. If one uses Bennett’s terminology, a case can 
certainly be made for saying that some of these municipalities are ‘over 
bounded'.  
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Finally, the duplication of scarce services between the district and local is 
a matter of concern. Many B managers argued quite strongly for a unitary 
authority for their core urban area. However, the district would lose a 
significant portion of its revenue and would not have the resources to 
support poorer municipalities with little tax bases. Should the debate 
about unitary-tier structures be about economies of scale arguments and 
not about narrow concerns about towns retaining their RSC levies? If 
such levies are collected nationally and transferred back on the basis of 
some redistributive formula, then the merits of single-tier secondary 
towns can be more rationally considered. 
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